登入選單

返回Google圖書搜尋

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

Youngseok ParkJean Paul RabanalOlga A. RudPhilip Johnson Grossman

出版	Monash University, Monash Business School, Department of Economics, 2020
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=u-shzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjostrom, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.