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Google圖書搜尋
The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation
Andreas Bernecker
Pierre C. Boyer
Christina Gathmann
其他書名
Evidence from the U.S. Welfare Reform
出版
Centre for Economic Policy Research
, 2018
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=u3zGxQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
We investigate whether the decision to experiment with novel policies is influenced by electoral incentives. Our empirical setting is the U.S. welfare reform in 1996, which marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. We find that electoral incentives matter: governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment with policies than governors with little electoral support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected experiment more than governors striving for reelection. The importance of electoral incentives is robust to controlling for governor ideology, voter preferences for redistribution, the influence of the legislature, or for learning among states. A comparison of the role of governor ideology and electoral incentives reveals that both contribute about equally to policy experimentation.
