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Personnel Economics

Peter Kuhn

出版	Oxford University Press, 2018
主題	Business & Economics / Consumer BehaviorBusiness & Economics / Human Resources & Personnel ManagementBusiness & Economics / Labor / GeneralBusiness & Economics / MotivationalBusiness & Economics / Economics / GeneralBusiness & Economics / Workplace Culture
ISBN	01993780109780199378012
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=u4pQtAEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

Principal-agent models. Structure of the principal-agent problem -- Solving the agent's problem -- Solving the principal's problem -- Best for whom? Efficiency and distribution -- Extensions : uncertainty, risk aversion and multiple tasks -- Noisy performance measures and optimal monitoring -- Evidence on employee motivation. Empirical methods in personnel economics -- Performance pay at Safelite Glass : higher productivity, pay and profits -- Some "non-classical" motivators -- Reciprocity at work : gift exchange, implicit contracts, and trust -- Pigeons and pecks : incentives and income effects -- Employee selection and training. Choosing qualifications -- Risky versus safe workers -- Recruitment : selecting individual workers -- Setting pay levels -- Training -- Competition in the workplace : the economics of relative rewards. A simple model of tournaments -- Some caveats : sabotage, collusion, and risk-taking in tournaments -- Unfair and uneven tournaments -- Who wants to compete? Selection into tournaments -- The economics of teams. Incentives in teams and the free-rider problem -- Team production in practice -- Complementarity, substitutability and ability differences in teams -- Choosing teams: self-selection and team assignment.