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Gratitude and the Correlativity of Obligations and Rights

出版	Georgetown University-Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Philosophy, 2014
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=uij7sgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋After presenting an account of gratitude, I argue in chapter 3 that there are indeed obligations of gratitude: certain acts or omissions a grateful beneficiary morally must do, which admit of no latitude, and are wrong to fail to do. In chapter 4, I show that obligations of gratitude are owed to the benefactor in all the significant ways a promissory obligation is owed to a promisee. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that while a benefactor does not have a right to demand gratitude, she does have an imperfect right to gratitude: standing to resent and remonstrate with an ungrateful beneficiary. I argue that one common version of the correlativity thesis, that directed moral obligations entail standing to demand (a perfect right), is inconsistent with the facts about gratitude, and should be rejected. In its place, we should accept a modified version of the correlativity thesis: moral obligations correlate to rights, which may be perfect or imperfect. I conclude by discussing ramifications the rejection of the common correlativity thesis has for arguments about obligations of friendship and political obligation.