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Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Robert J. AumannMichael MaschlerRichard E. Stearns
出版MIT Press, 1995
主題Business & Economics / Finance / GeneralBusiness & Economics / Economics / GeneralMathematics / Game TheoryPolitical Science / International Relations / Arms Control
ISBN02620114769780262011471
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=xaa7xZ-WGBsC&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBookSAMPLE
註釋During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected in this text, with the addition of postscripts describing many of the developments since the papers were written. The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.