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Une Théorie Incitative Des Prêts Bancaires

Xinzhu Zhang

出版	1997
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=y7B0tgAACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

In a typical specialized bank in china's banking system, both commercial loans and policy loans are dealt with. Policy loans are characterized by favouritism in terms of either favourable rationing rule or lending rate. My main objective is to analyze the incentive problems due to information asymmetry and/or the very existence of internal structure. The first chapter provides a general analysis of china's banking system and some related institutional matters. In the second chapter we address the issue of the implementability of favouritism under a supply constraint and under various conditions of the observability of outputs. The result shows that favouritism entails more allocative distortion as loanable funds become smaller. The third chapter analyzes in a hierarchical model how to take into account the incentive of the intermediary, i.e. the regional bank. The result suggests that its authority of credit decision should be limited in terms of the investment size as an organizational response to the collusion threat. The fourth chapter analyzes the effect of decentralization under a single supply constraint. The result shows that collusion has no impact as the result of competition for rent in each region.