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Constraining Proliferation
註釋"While many studies have evaluated specific verification techniques, procedures or agencies, relatively little has been written about the multiplier effects associated with verification synergies. This study argues that the combination of separate aspects of arms control verification produces a whole greater than the sum obtainable from each of the separate parts. The term "synergies" encompasses the combinative effects arising between verification methods and techniques, between agreements or regimes, between implementing mechanisms and forums, between organizations and agencies within a country, between countries party to an agreement, and various combinations of these items. The resultant synergistic effects may be simultaneous or sequential. This paper identifies many of these effects, using specific arms control examples, where appropriate, and with special emphasis on examples relating to non-proliferation. It also provides a basis for taking these synergies into account during the process of formulating and evaluating the effectiveness of the verification regimes of particular agreements and actions. This paper considers three forms of verification: co-operative, adversarial and coercive, as exemplified by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq following the War in the Gulf, respectively. Appendices A and B take a second approach, addressing the subject from a different perspective, using a high level of abstraction. Deriving a formal model of some aspects of verification synergies, a mathematical analysis is presented in Appendix A to demonstrate several underlying dynamics of the topic."--Page iii.