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The Political Economy of Economic and Monetary Union Reform

出版	SSRN, 2023
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=yh8z0AEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋This study explores the conflict structure of the negotiations on the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the determinants of member states' positions during the Eurozone crisis. My main hypothesis is that national governments' positions on EMU reform were mainly determined by domestic economic and political concerns. Using insights from theories on European integration and the literature on the comparative political economy of the Eurozone crisis, I conceptualise the negotiation process on EMU reform as a bargaining game between advocates of a stability union based on fiscal discipline on one side, and supporters of a transfer union based on fiscal risk-sharing on the other. This cleavage serves as the backdrop for the analysis of member states' positions in the negotiations process and their determinants. The empirical analysis shows the distributional consequence of EMU reforms can broadly account for the pattern of political conflict between member states along the fiscal discipline/ fiscal transfers cleavage. More specifically, evidence in this study shows that national governments' overall position on EMU reform along the fiscal discipline/ fiscal transfers cleavage can largely be explained by domestic macroeconomic factors such as the competitiveness of their economies, the sovereign debt burden, and the exposure of their financial sectors. On the other hand, data on domestic public opinion on EMU reform is overall less consistent with national governments' positions, suggesting that policymakers could have been isolated from domestic political pressures.