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Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor
Sara A. DalyJohn ParachiniWilliam Rosenau
其他書名
Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism
出版RAND Corporation, 2005
主題Political Science / GeneralPolitical Science / Terrorism
ISBN08330376179780833037619
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=zYbaAAAAMAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋Even before the 9/11 attacks on the United States, national security officials had grown increasingly concerned about the potential for terrorists to acquire unconventional weapons or devices. Denying terrorists access to nuclear materials and components has been a particularly urgent priority, given the enormously destructive potential of terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device. To provide an empirical basis for policymaking, this documented briefing explores attempts by nonstate actors to acquire nuclear materials and to fabricate nuclear systems. Three cases were selected for analysis. Although other terrorist groups in the past have shown interest in acquiring nuclear materials and devices, the two groups examined in this study, Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have demonstrated a commitment unmatched by other organizations. In addition, a substantial body of open-source material was available, although some of it was unreliable and contradictory, making absolute judgments impossible. The case of the disappearance of nuclear fuel rods from a reactor in Zaire illustrates what might be termed the "supply side" of the nuclear market and illustrates the pathways that terrorists or criminals might follow to obtain nuclear material. As with the two other cases explored here, open source material was available, although in many instances this information provided only a fragmentary and tentative account.