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Understanding Proto-insurgencies
Daniel Byman
出版Rand Corporation, 2007
主題History / Military / Revolutions & Wars of IndependencePolitical Science / International Relations / GeneralPolitical Science / Security (National & International)Political Science / Political FreedomPolitical Science / Intelligence & EspionagePolitical Science / TerrorismTechnology & Engineering / Military Science
ISBN08330413639780833041364
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=z_vr9pppLCcC&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBookSAMPLE
註釋To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, intelligence, and military services. Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-insurgencies seek to accomplish. Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe haven, money, training, and help with political mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, and legitimize them, making government delegitimization efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a movement's overall success. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground is through in-group policing. The government can also promote rival identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto-insurgents' weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. Appendix A looks at the experiences of four armed groups -- the Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the Islamic Group (IG), and the Palestinian organization Fatah until 1993 -- and examines why Hizballah became a successful insurgent movement, while EIJ and Fatah never made this leap despite being enduring terrorist groups. Appendix B examines the possibility of an insurgency in Saudi Arabia today. Finally, Appendix C describes some measures that indicate when proto-insurgencies may grow into full-blown insurgent movements.