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On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge
註釋The recent focus on cultural knowledge in counterinsurgency operations and tactics is a welcome development insofar as it has allowed field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to radically reassess the failed operations and tactics in counterinsurgency in both these places. If cultural knowledge has helped U.S. forces to refocus their efforts to better achieve their operational and tactical goals, the question our political leaders should be asking is whether cultural knowledge can also help them to redefine a broader strategic framework for counterinsurgency. The aim of this monograph is two-fold. First, it attempts to distinguish between the various "levels" of cultural knowledge and how they are used at various levels of warfare strategy, operations, and tactics. Although not mutually exclusive, cultural knowledge informs these distinct levels in different ways. Second, the monograph attempts to explore how cultural knowledge might help to redefine an overarching strategy on counterinsurgency. While the military has been at the forefront of significant new and innovative thinking about operations and tactics, revising its old doctrines on the fly, America's political leaders have failed to provide the necessary strategic framework to guide counterinsurgency. The monograph concludes by suggesting four distinct ways in which cultural knowledge can work to help redefine an overarching strategic framework for counterinsurgency; (1) Reconceptualizing the "war on terror" not as one war, but as many different wars; (2) Focusing less on the moral distinctions between "us" and "them"--A major centerpiece of the Bush Doctrine -- and more on the differences between "them"; (3) Building support and relationships among both friendly and adversary states by taking into account how other societies assess risks, define their security, and perceive threats; and (4) Building support for counterinsurgency among America's civilian leaders.