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Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking

Guglielmo BaroneFabiano SchivardiEnrico Sette

出版	Luiss Lab of European Economics, Department of Economics and Business, LUISS Guido Carli, 2020
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=q_WezQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We study the effects on loan rates of a quasi-experimental change in the Italian legislation which forbids interlocking directorates between banks. We use a difference-in-differences approach and exploit multiple banking relationships to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We find that the reform decreased rates charged by previously interlocked banks to common customers by between 10-30 basis points. The effect is stronger if the firm had a weaker bargaining power vis-a-vis the interlocked banks. Consistent with the assumption that interlocking directorates facilitate collusion, interest rates on loans from interlocked banks become more dispersed after the reform.